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During the eighteen days of the Egyptian 
revolution, some hundred  police stations 
in popular quarters in Cairo were burned 
down. Official accounts reported this as 
the work of baltagiya (thugs). The ques-
tion of who burned the police stations 
serves as an entry point to problematizing 
the identity of baltagiya. Thus, examining 
the gendered affective registers linked to 
the baltagi (thug) is essential in under-
standing the potential of the revolution-
ary moment and the urgency with which 
the state had to reinstate the narrative of 
the baltagi as a dangerous criminal to jus-
tify mass violence and speed urban trans-
formation projects. 
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Introduction  
Scholars such as Diane Singerman 
(Avenues of Participation), Farha Ghannam 
(Live and Die Like a Man), Paul Amar 
(Turning the Gendered Politics of the 
Security State Inside Out?) and Salwa 
Ismail (Youth, Gender and the State in 
Cairo), who have made substantial contri-
butions in the study of the life and politics 
of the urban poor in Cairo, had at the heart 
of their projects local constructions of 
gender relations. Amar, Ismail and 
Ghannam have focused on the construc-
tion of urban-poor masculinity. Ghannam 
argues that masculinity in the Middle East 
is still “under-studied, and under-theo-
rized.” (5) Ghannam notes that the absence 
of serious scholarly engagement on 
Middle East masculinity has been coupled 
with an antagonistic public discourse on 
Arab and Muslim men (4-5). In this vein, 
men in the Middle East “are portrayed 
either as a threat to be crushed or enemies 
to be subjugated and controlled” 
(Ghannam 5) Ghannam and Amar among 
other scholars have identified a gap in crit-
ical Middle East masculinity studies. In 
affect studies a similar gap exists.  “While 
feminist and queer theory were in on the 
ground floor of developments in affect 
studies, masculinity studies has been 
much slower to develop relations to affect” 
(Reeser and Gottzén 149). Yet scholars 
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acknowledge that “affect is a key element 
of subjectivity and should be factored in 
to all wings of gender studies” (Reeser 
and Gottzén 151). According to philoso-
pher Brian Massumi, affect is a noncon-
scious, pre-lingual bodily intensity that is 
distinct from emotions, while emotions is 
what gets verbalized from affect and cap-
tured in language. In this paper I subscribe 
largely to the definitions of affect and 
emotions developed by Deborah Gould 
who bases her definitions on the work of 
Massumi: 
I use the term affect to indicate noncon-
scious and unnamed, but nevertheless 
registered, experiences of bodily ener-
gy and intensity that arise in response 
to stimuli impinging on the body (...). 
As a body’s registered sensation of a 
moment existing relationally, interac-
tively, in the world, affect is an effect of 
being affected, and an effect that is its-
elf a preparation to act in response, but 
in no preset or determined way. An af-
fective state is, in other words, unfixed 
and polygenerative (26). 
Gould further explains, “I use the idea of 
an emotion or emotions to describe what 
from the potential of bodily intensities 
gets actualized or concretized in the flow 
of living” (26). 
Western philosophy has an inherit binary 
that equates men with reason and women 
with emotions. Reeser and Gottzén have 
identified a “Cartesian split between body 
and mind, in which men are inherently 
associated with reason” (147). Ghannam 
recognizes this binary and argues against 
what she calls the “over-embodiment” of 
women in Western media and academia 
and the “disembodiment” of men: “By ‘dis-
embodiment’ I mean the tendency to 
equate men with mind’ (’aql), culture, rea-
son, honor, and public life, while offering 
little (if any) discussion of emotions, feel-
ings, or bodily matters” (4). It is essential to 
adopt an intersectional approach when 
studying urban- poor masculinity. 
According to Ghannam (8) intersectional-
ity can help us understand how male sub-
jectivities are created in intersection with 
patriarchy and capitalism. The urban poor 
have been at the heart of what constitutes 
“the people” in the infamous slogan “the 
people demand the downfall of the 
regime”. During the eighteen days, some 
hundred police stations in popular quar-
ters in Cairo were burned down. Salwa 
Ismail contests official accounts which 
reported that this was the work of balt-
agiya (thugs). The question of who burned 
the police stations during the eighteen 
days could serve as an entry point into 
problematizing the identity of baltagiya 
rather than simply positing them in oppo-
sition to the revolutionaries. The revolu-
tionary moment blurred the lines between 
who was a thug and who was a revolution-
ary; since all protestors were outlaws, 
everyone became a thug. My empirical 
work has shown that this was moment of 
subversion and renegotiation of the urban 
poor’s affective dispositions. Hemmings 
(564) argues that bodies are captured and 
held by affective structures, but this revo-
lutionary moment presented an opportu-
nity for an aggressive demarcation of bod-
ies as embedded in disruptions to the 
gender order. Building on the above 
accounts and my empirical research, I do 
not argue for a radical change in the gen-
der order nor for a redefinition of mascu-
linity. Instead I propose an examinination 
of the gendered narratives linked to the 
baltagi, as these are essential in under-
standing local politics, the potential of the 
revolutionary moment and the urgency 
with which the state had to quickly rein-
state the historical narrative of the baltagi 
as a dangerous criminal in order to justify 
mass violence, shift blame and speed 
urban- transformation projects.
The main research questions explored in 
this paper are how can we understand 
urban-poor masculinity in the wake of the 
Arab Spring? How does the Egyptian state 
demonize the urban subaltern, how do 
state strategies circulate, and how are they 
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reinforced in an affective economy 
(Ahmed 64) of fear? 
This paper1 is based on ethnographic 
fieldwork. The data in this paper was col-
lected over two years between 2016 and 
2018 during work on my PhD thesis. I used 
ethnographic methods such as participa-
tory observation of the activities of the 
Maspero youth alliance, and I conducted 
in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
activists and community leaders of several 
popular committees in Cairo and Giza. 
A Brief History of Maspero Triangle
Maspero Triangle is located in the south of 
the Bulaq abu al-Ila district in downtown 
Cairo adjacent to Tahrir square and the 
Egyptian Radio and Television Union 
headquarters and the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. Over the years the neighborhood 
expanded to house around 14,000 inhab-
itants (Madd Platform). The earthquake in 
1992 affected Maspero Triangle as well as 
most historical areas in Cairo. Several 
houses needed repairs, however, and the 
government refused to grant maintenance 
licenses to the owners and tenants. 
Prohibiting renovation and restoration was 
a state strategy to expedite the slow death 
of the neighborhood; as old buildings col-
lapsed, the government was able to seize 
the land (Madd Platform 143, [Amnesty 
International 19]). This continued until 
2008 when two things happened that had 
important consequences for the area 
under study. The first is that the General 
Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) 
released a project for changing the urban 
landscape of Cairo called Cairo 2050. The 
plan envisioned the future Cairo with high-
rise buildings, luxury hotels, tourist areas 
and office towers. The main idea was to 
modernize Cairo and what this would have 
meant for the urban poor living in histori-
cal areas or downtown Cairo was reloca-
tion so as to allow space for foreign inves-
tors to develop their mega- projects. 
Urban scholars heavily criticized the plan 
(Madd Platform). According to Omnia 
Khalil, the second incident that happened 
in 2008 was the collapse of a massive rock 
on the residents’ of one of Cairo’s informal 
settlements  (Deweqa) leaving at least 119 
dead. The devastation was massive and 
the incident opened a public discussion 
on the hazardous situation of Cairo’s slums 
and put pressure on the government to do 
something about this problem. Thus, the 
Informal Settlements Development Fund 
was established in 2008 (ISDF). ISDF clas-
sified 4,004 areas, where 85,000 people 
live, as unsafe based on international cri-
teria set by UN-Habitat (Khalil). The people 
in these areas have been slated for reloca-
tion. According to ISDF, the neighborhood 
of Maspero Triangle is considered an 
unsafe area due to unsuitable living con-
ditions. As a result, the Cairo governorate 
intensified its forced evacuations. In an 
attempt to organize themselves and coor-
dinate a response, the youth of the 
Maspero Triangle established the The 
Voluntary Alliance of the Youth and People 
of Maspero in Defense of the Land and 
Housing Rights. Despite community orga-
nizing and local activism, the Cairo gover-
norate continued evictions while aided by 
a legal framework that gives the state the 
power to evict residents without necessar-
ily providing compensation or alternative 
housing (Amnesty International 29).
Policing Youth
Evictions, possible evictions, and encoun-
ters with the police feature prominently in 
all of my interlocutors’ narratives. Evictions 
intensified clashes with the police in an 
already highly securitized area. Mohamed, 
a resident of Maspero Triangle told me 
about one of those encounters.
In 2010 they called me at my work and 
told me that the police were in the 
neighborhood evacuating some of the 
buildings. It was a strange rainy day. 
I went to the area and found that the 
police had created a security cordon 
around the alley where I lived. I had 
been working against evictions since 
2001; I had been following this dream 
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for nine years and abandoned all my 
personal goals. Suddenly I felt that all 
my efforts had disappeared into thin 
air because of their laws. They threw 
people’s stuff on the streets. I pushed 
against the officers to break the cor-
don, I did not care, the dream was over 
so why should I live. They kept pushing 
me back until the sheriff saw me. This 
was the second confrontation between 
us. The sheriff came and asked who I 
was and what did I want? I told him I 
lived here and I worked as a teacher so 
that they would not then put their se-
curity on to me. I asked him if he had 
notified the residents that he would be 
coming here today to throw their stuff 
in the streets. His deputy replied by 
saying that they had notified the peo-
ple three days before. I gathered the 
people around and asked them if an-
yone had received a notice that the po-
lice would come in three days to throw 
their stuff in the street. They all said no. 
I contacted human rights organizations 
and told them that the police were 
here and had created a security cordon 
and were throwing people’s stuff in the 
street and that they might arrest some 
of the residents. They said that they 
would come right away. When they ar-
rived I asked them to take pictures and 
document what was happening. The 
sheriff gave an order to prohibit jour-
nalists from coming into the area and 
taking any pictures (Mohamed Inter-
view, 20162). This is only one encounter 
of many that the residents of the neigh-
borhood had to endure and that struc-
tured their relationship with the state. 
The police specifically targeted active 
male youth such as Mohamed because 
they were outspoken and able to con-
tact the media and human rights orga-
nizations and mobilize people. Targe-
ting young urban-poor men was not 
specific to the Maspero neighborhood; 
however, the threat of evictions intensi-
fied the scrutiny. Ismail (224) analyzes 
the changes in state-society relations in 
Egypt as the role of the state changes 
from welfare provision to securitizati-
on. According to Ismail “Youths in the 
Middle East, especially young men, 
have been important actors in opposi-
tional movements in the region” (224). 
This made them prone to being targe-
ted by the state. Laws such as the law 
on thuggery (Qanun al-Baltaga) that 
was passed in 1998 enabled the state 
to police young urban men in poor 
neighborhoods and conduct police 
raids in these areas or undertake arrest 
campaigns. Ismail argues that under-
standing young men’s oppositional 
relation to the state is essential in the 
construction of their masculinity: “The 
management of young men’s public 
presence is a particular preoccupation 
of state authorities, especially the poli-
ce” (235). The young men from Bulaq 
abu al-Ila and the Maspero Triangle re-
counted numerous stories about their 
encounters with the police. Mahmoud 
told me about one of his experiences 
that resonated with all the other young 
men and they all said that they had had 
a similar experience. Mahmoud, who 
is from Bulaq abu al-Ila and in his mid-
twenties, was one day walking around 
downtown when a police officer stop-
ped him and asked him to present 
his ID card, a practice that is followed 
by the police and called suspicion 
and investigation (ishtibah wa tahari). 
Mahmoud presented his ID card to 
the officer, when the officer saw the 
address on his ID card he asked him if 
he was from Bulaq and what was he do-
ing downtown. Mahmoud told me the 
story laughingly because the question 
was absurd, Bulaq is downtown and in 
fact he was very close to his neighbor-
hood – just not in it. Ismail notes that 
these everyday confrontations are over 
“territorial markings” (225), and based 
on her fieldwork in a neighborhood si-
milar to Maspero Triangle she argues, 
“For young men, urban space is map-
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ped out in terms of zones of relative 
safety or danger” (236). The everyday 
encounters of young men from po-
pular areas with the state has pushed 
them into developing spatial identities 
related to where they live: “The issue of 
the territorial identity of youth deser-
ves closer attention when examining 
questions of activism and youth rela-
tions with the state. Territorial markings 
are lines drawn in contest. Thus, to pro-
duce a territorial identity is to establish 
spatial title in relation to others, inclu-
ding the state” (Ismail 225). These ter-
ritorial identities can help explain the 
affective attachments that the people 
from popular quarters develop to their 
neighborhoods as well as the difficulty 
of eviction and relocation policies. Is-
mail notes that state strategies to con-
trol young men from urban-poor areas 
are imbedded in the anti-terrorism nar-
rative, which draws a link between the 
state configuration of the balatgi and 
the terrorist (236). 
Ismail emphasizes that the problem of 
thuggery has been associated in official 
and media discourses with informal hous-
ing and urban-poor neighborhoods 
(Ismail, “The Egyptian Revolution against 
the Police” 451). Ismail builds on Connell’s 
(80-81) notion of “marginalized masculini-
ties” to explain how the antagonistic rela-
tion between the state and the urban-poor 
youth serves to structure their masculinity. 
“Marginalized masculinities are inflicted 
with the humiliation experienced at the 
hands of agents of the state and with the 
absence of any shield from state repres-
sion such as higher class status” (Ismail, 
“Youth, Gender and the State in Cairo” 
231). Consequently, Ismail argues that 
men negotiate their “injured masculinity” 
(223) by attempting to dominate women 
through the policing of their public and 
private behavior. I contest Ismail’s argu-
ment based on my fieldwork. But the con-
cept of marginalized masculinity can be 
helpful in capturing the experience of 
urban-poor male youth; and in spite of my 
male interlocutors’ conservative narratives 
on gender norms, what I observed in the 
field is young men negotiating their mar-
ginalized masculinity by building alliances 
with women who are also oppressed by 
local patriarchal structures. This is 
attributed to the Egyptian revolution that 
revamped local politics and opened up 
more space for youth and women to play 
a bigger role in their community. I attended 
some of the meetings organized by the 
Maspero youth alliance that aimed at dis-
cussing possible ways to resist evictions. 
One of the things that I observed was the 
alliance and coordination between 
women and youth of the neighborhood, 
especially within the framework of the 
Maspero youth alliance. The fact that 
women played an important role in local 
activism was not itself a surprise, what was 
interesting was how this contradicted the 
narrative of young male activists when I 
asked them about the role of women in 
the Maspero youth alliance. Ismail encoun-
tered the same phenomenon during her 
fieldwork. In discussing the role of women 
as mediators with the state, she says, “The 
role of women in mediating this experi-
ence of state domination is pushed out of 
men’s narratives. Rather, male youths insist 
that women are idle gossipers, doing little 
but displaying their feminine wiles” 
(“Youth, Gender and the State in Cairo” 
231). Similarly, whenever I asked young 
male activists about the role of their female 
counterparts, they usually downplayed 
women’s role as merely auxiliary to their 
own efforts. Contrary to this narrative, in 
practice young male activists and women 
in the Maspero Triangle seemed to coor-
dinate and collaborate in pushing their 
agenda forward. Young male activists 
relied heavily on women’s community out-
reach, organization skills, and negotiation 
abilities. What was obvious from this meet-
ing as well as others was that young male 
activists worked closely with women in 
Maspero and Bulaq. Even when their male 
counterparts did not acknowledge this 
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role, young women played an integral part 
in local activism and popular committees. 
Women engaged in building a local alli-
ance with young male activists in their 
neighborhoods that enabled them albeit 
temporarily to disrupt old networks of 
power. In Bulaq a woman named abu 
al-Ila Salma, in her early thirties and a 
member of the Bulaq abu al-Ila popular 
committee, decided to run for parliamen-
tary elections in 2014. Local young male 
and female activists who saw in her the 
possibility of representing their voice in 
the parliament ran Salma’s election cam-
paign. Salma and her campaign knew that 
they had small chance of winning but they 
wanted to make a point that a female can-
didate can run in their neighborhood. 
Salma was not the only one; Nazra for 
Feminist Studies published a report in 
2012 profiling sixteen female candidates 
who ran in the parliamentary elections 
after the revolution.3 Women were 
empowered after the revolution to join 
formal politics and seek representation. 
This was also reflected in local politics 
through the alliance between women and 
youth in popular committees4 that could 
have led to a change in the gender 
dynamic had it been able to continue. 
Escalating violence, political polarization 
and security threats have led to the dis-
banding of most of the popular commit-
tees. 
Reinstating Fear: The Making of the balt-
agi and the Terrorist 
In the Maspero massacre,5 people from 
the Bulaq abu al-Ila and Maspero neigh-
borhoods were implicated as perpetrators 
of violence. According to a press release 
from EIPR following the incident, “people 
in civilian clothes joined the army’s assault 
on protesters. A large number of witnesses 
stated that these were Muslims from the 
areas of Bulaq abu al-Ila and Ghamra.”6 In 
the Maspero neighborhood the question 
as to any involvement of the residents in 
the Maspero massacre was a controversial 
one. Residents had different accounts of 
the night and their involvement in it. 
Abdou’s account, one of my main interloc-
utors in the Maspero Triangle, shows a 
certain awareness, political intent and 
engagement with the incident. 
The stance of the alliance (Maspero 
youth alliance) throughout the past 
few years has always been revolutio-
nary (...) . State media outlets claimed 
that people from the Bulaq abu al-Ila 
and Maspero Triangle neighborhoods 
were the ones who killed the Coptic 
protestors. In response, a large march 
was organized from Bulaq abu al-Ila 
to express solidarity with Coptic pro-
testors and protest SCAF and to accu-
se SCAF of spreading lies and delu-
ding the people. The protestors in the 
march announced officially that Copts 
are a part of us and we would never 
hurt them. We announced officially that 
the military was the one who attacked 
Coptic protestors and we were the 
ones who were treating the injured in 
our neighborhood. There are things 
that happened in Bulaq abu al-Ila that 
are central to the history of the revolu-
tion and its truth and the reality of the 
role of people from popular neigh-
borhoods in the revolution and Bulaq 
was at the forefront. Specifically be-
cause this neighborhood and its peo-
ple lived the revolution, so they always 
took a stance and were always accused 
of being thugs and having killed the 
Copts. The reaction was two thousand 
people from the popular committee 
and the alliance marching from Bulaq 
abu al-Ila to protest SCAF and Tantawy 
and say that they were the ones who 
killed the Copts (...). Two weeks after 
we announced the solidarity of the 
people of Bulaq abu al-Ila with Coptic 
protestors – that we supported their sit-
in, that the neighborhood was open to 
them to counter the rumors that were 
circulating, and we published the state-
ments on Facebook and other websi-
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tes – the army broke up the sit-in. The 
Coptic sit-in was dispersed, some died, 
some were injured but we protested. 
The media claimed that the people of 
Bulaq abu al-Ila beat the Copts, so we 
organized marches to protest SCAF 
and called for the downfall of the mili-
tary regime. The Copts joined this pro-
test and we announced to all the media 
outlets that the army was responsible 
and that we as the people of Bulaq 
abu al-Ila were here protesting this. We 
chanted this in front of everyone. Bulaq 
had clear stances and opposed all re-
gimes, the Muslim Brotherhood, SCAF 
and Mubarak (Abdou Interview, 20167).
As evinced in Abdou’s narrative, in 2011 
Maspero was one of the most militant 
neighborhoods – along with many in 
downtown and old Cairo – in defending 
the occupation of Tahrir square. As 
Maspero was adjacent to Tahrir, it played 
a crucial role in sustaining the square 
during the eighteen days. However, the 
thuggery narratives were used to vilify the 
urban poor and undermine their politics. 
According to Amar (308), these orientalist 
tropes of thuggery are not new; they are 
in fact imbedded in a historical colonial 
tradition. Sara Ahmed reminds us that 
“fear opens up past histories of associa-
tion” (63) which distinguishes bodies from 
each other in the present. Ahmed argues 
that 
fear works to contain some bodies 
such that they take up less space. In 
this way, emotions work to align bodi-
ly space with social space (...). In other 
words, fear works to restrict some bo-
dies through the movement or expan-
sion of others (69). 
According to Ahmed, “fear may also work 
as an affective economy” (64). In this vein, 
racialized fear of Middle East maleness 
circulates in a global affective economy 
governed by tropes of thuggery and ter-
rorism. Amar argues: 
Of course, ‘time bomb masculinity’ is 
also just a dumbed-down or depoliti-
cized version of the ‘suicide bomber’ 
trope, which has become the justifica-
tion for ratcheting up surveillance and 
undercutting civil liberties in the Midd-
le East, as well as in European cities. In 
this sense, it represents the ultimate 
militarization of the respectability dis-
course of urban modernity (316). 
The Arab Spring defied the exceptional-
ism of the Arab region and produced 
images that contradicted the traditional 
tropes of the Arab street and the dis-
courses of masculinity in crisis. In this 
sense, it disrupted the global affective 
economy of fear surrounding the unruly 
Arab masses. These problematic notions 
were used to justify the war on terror, 
occupations, and the policing of certain 
bodies dating back to colonial rule. This 
disruption caused a crisis of legitimacy for 
the Egyptian regime that legitimizes its 
dictatorial rule internationally based on 
control of the uncivilized mob. Moreover, 
it opened up a space for the renegotiation 
of the depiction of the Arab street. This 
challenge was unwelcomed by not only 
domestic forces but also international 
ones. Two main tropes, the baltagi and the 
terrorist, have been masterfully used by 
the Egyptian state in a manner that feeds 
into and is in synchronization with a global 
affective economy of fear. These narratives 
culminated in General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi 
declaring a war on terror in 2013. 
I have a request for Egyptians, next 
Friday all honorable and honest Egyp-
tians should go on the streets to give 
me a mandate and an order to fight the 
potential violence and terrorism.  
On the 24th of July 2013, General Abd El 
Fattah al-Sisi declared war on terror and 
he demanded that honorable Egyptians 
take to the streets to sanction his fight 
against any impending terrorism. The key 
word here is potential. Brian Massumi 
explains the futurity of threat and the role 
of feelings in creating and sustaining a 
threat.  
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What is not actually real can be felt 
into being. Threat does have an actual 
mode of existence: fear, as foreshado-
wing. Threat has an impending reality 
in the present. This actual reality is af-
fective. Fear is the anticipatory reality 
in the present of a threatening future. 
It is the felt reality of the nonexistent, 
loomingly present as the affective fact 
of the matter (Massumi 53-54).
Thus, the felt reality can supersede the 
actual reality and the affective fact of the 
matter can replace the actual facts: “If we 
feel a threat, there was a threat. Threat is 
affectively self-causing” (Massumi 54). The 
threat is real as long as it feels real; conse-
quently, the decision to act upon that feel-
ing is justified. The felt reality of the threat 
of violence became the deciding factor 
that mobilized thousands on the day of 
the mandate for al-Sisi to commit one of 
the most horrendous massacres in Egypt’s 
modern history: the Rabaa massacre. And 
it did not end here. Massumi argues that 
the fact that a threat has been actualized 
does not mean that it is not real but rather 
that it will remain real forever: “The future 
threat is forever” (53). The threat remains 
ready to be utilized whenever necessary. 
By declaring the war on terror, al-Sisi cre-
ated a threat that legitimized preemptive 
action against a threat he had called into 
being. During the summer of 2013, 
General Abd El Fattah al-Sisi managed to 
create an “atmosphere of fear” (Massumi 
61) that subsumed every felt problem in 
Egypt under the rubric of terrorism. 
Massumi suggests an ecological approach 
in understanding how different regimes of 
power interact and develop together. He 
claims, 
To understand the political power of 
threat and the preemptive politics avai-
ling itself of threat-potential, it is neces-
sary to situate preemptive power in a 
field of interaction with other regimes 
of power (Massumi 62). 
The main argument is that fear resonates 
and gains momentum through its circula-
tion internationally. These regimes of 
power not only interact with but are largely 
dependent on each other. These narra-
tives are interdependent and feed into a 
global atmosphere of fear (Massumi 61) or 
an affective economy of fear (Ahmed 64). 
Sara Ahmed argues that (79) the function 
of the terrorist narrative is to expand the 
power to detain and control certain bod-
ies. Fear could be associated with some 
bodies but the sliding of fear justifies the 
expansion of power as needed. And the 
threat is always present and real because 
the figure of the terrorist is always shifting. 
Fear is associated with certain bodies but 
does not reside in a single figure, the ter-
rorist, the protestor, the baltagi; these cat-
egories can all collapse into one another 
and therefore justify state control of these 
bodies. 
Conclusion
After years of confusion and uncertainty, 
amid rumors of imminent forced evictions, 
the deputy minister of housing held a 
meeting with Maspero residents in 2017 
and announced three alternatives. The 
first was monetary compensation for the 
demolition of their properties, amounting 
to $5,000 (U.S.); the second was relocation 
to Asmarat (a social housing project for 
people removed from informal areas); and 
the third was taking apartments in the 
Maspero Triangle after the development 
project had been completed. Uncertainty 
and a lack of faith in the government’s 
plan led many to choose monetary com-
pensation or relocation to Asmarat. This 
ended residents’ dreams of staying in 
Maspero after its development, leaving 
only some 900 families who chose to 
remain in the neighborhood. Whether or 
not the government will give residents 
their promised housing units remains to 
be seen. There were some gains from the 
process however – residents benefited 
from interaction with architects, urban 
researchers and civil society activists, and 
were able to negotiate some possible 
gains from the governorate, such as the 
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promise that 900 families would have a 
place in Maspero after development of 
the area, although this remains to be seen. 
Geographer Nigel Thrift argues that inter-
action between space, bodies and affect 
is linked to political consequences. He 
suggests that affect is politically engi-
neered and restructured in urban every-
day life with varying political motivations. 
This can include the erasure of emotional 
histories, creating new affective registers, 
or mobilizing old ones (Thrift 172). Thus, it 
is not farfetched to argue that the urban 
restructuring of cities can elicit or inhibit 
political responses. The wider plan of the 
Egyptian government to drastically 
change downtown Cairo, a space that wit-
nessed a revolution, has interlinked polit-
ical and affective goals. It aims to expunge 
the affective register of the 2011 Egyptian 
revolution and impede the politics of the 
urban poor.
The narratives around thuggery were used 
to vilify the urban poor and undermine 
their politics. The protestor became a ter-
rorist or a baltagi or both depending on 
their political affiliation and social class. 
Fear contains certain bodies and expands 
others. Fear sticks to the bodies of protes-
tors and defines them as possible thugs or 
terrorists. We live in a global economy of 
fear built around the fear of Middle East 
bodies denoted as terrorists. The early 
days of the Arab revolutions opened up a 
space to radically distinguish these bodies 
from terrorists and to label them as protes-
tors calling for democracy. It was a moment 
that challenged a global order and ques-
tioned the legitimacy of an international 
security regime that targets Arab, Muslim 
or Middle East bodies. Thus, invoking the 
terrorist trope was not only an easy way to 
attack political Islam but also a trope that 
echoes international security paradigms 
and relegates Middle East bodies to their 
preassigned place. 
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5 Maspero Massacre started 
as a peaceful demonstration 
mainly by Coptic citizens 
protesting against 
discrimination on Oct. 9, 2011. 
It was violently dispersed, 28 
people were killed and more 
than 300 were injured.  





7Abdou. Personal Interview. 
25 Sept. 2016.
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1 This paper is based 
on research funded 
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Forschungsgemeinschaft 
(DFG, German Research 
Foundation) in the framework 
of the project “Political 
Participation, Emotion, Affect 
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(collaborative research center 
“Affective Societies”).
2 All the names of the 
research interlocutors 
have been changed into 
pseudonyms. Mohamed. 
Personal Interview. 27 Apr. 
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4 For an overview of the 
role of popular committee 
see Cilja Harders and Dina 
Wahba “New Neighborhood 
Power: Informal Popular 
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